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Gender and Tax Compliance: Firm Level Evidence from Ethiopia 
 
Seid Yimam and Fissha Asmare 
 
 
Summary 
 
Developing countries often lack tax information and enforcement capacity necessary to 
effectively implement instruments of a modern tax system, such as VAT, income taxes and 
others. An alternative strategy to increase tax compliance, and thus revenue, in these countries 
may depend on the capacity of policymakers to harness individual’s civicmindedness, social 
norms, reciprocity and cultural values of trust (Prichard, Custers, Dom, Davenport and Roscitt 
2019). To do so in an effective and targeted way, policymakers need clear evidence on how 
tax compliance correlates with key taxpayer characteristics, such as gender. However, such 
evidence remains limited in the Global South, particularly in Africa, and our study aims to fill 
this gap.  
 
In this study, we investigate the correlation between business owner’s gender and tax 
compliance in Ethiopian enterprises. We measure the tax compliance of businesses from tax 
audit registry data and combine it with survey data collected from 408 enterprises. Our results 
suggest that enterprises’ tax compliance behaviour is significantly affected by their owners’ 
gender: female owned enterprises are more likely to be tax compliant than those owned by 
men. The correlation between the owner’s gender and tax compliance also becomes stronger 
as enterprises get larger in size. 
 
The results of our study imply that development-related polices, especially in the area of tax 
administration and compliance, should consider the behavioural variation among male and 
female business owners. Moreover, improving the participation of women in business in the 
country may also enhance equity and tax revenue collection for better resource mobilisation 
and development. 
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Introduction  
 
Ethiopia has seen a sensational economic growth in the last decade. Sustaining such an 
economic growth requires strong domestic resource mobilisation, mainly boosting its tax 
revenue. However, weak institutional setup, corruption and absence of a transparent political 
system, on the one hand, and a high informality, coupled with poor awareness of paying tax 
among the business community, on the other, make tax collection ineffective. The problem is 
further exacerbated by the absence of policy-relevant studies that can shed light on ways to 
improve tax collection capacity and to develop a responsible and ethical business community. 
In light of this, our study shows how utilising taxpayer’s behavioural differences, especially 
business owners’ gender, would help to increase tax compliance and enhance government 
revenue. 
 
Traditional tax compliance models (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Bruno 2019; Slemrod and 
Yitzhaki 2002) focus on tax enforcement mechanisms, such as audits and penalties, for better 
tax revenue collection. The effectiveness of such enforcement mechanisms depends on the 
availability of verifiable tax information and on the administrative capacity of detecting tax 
evaders. These traditional models particularly assume that taxpayers are rational and pay their 
taxes because they fear the penalties that are applicable if they are caught evading (Allingham 
and Sandmo 1972; Bruno 2019; Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). Linking tax enforcement, tax 
morale and tax compliance, Filippin, Fiorio and Viviano (2013) also show that tax enforcement 
has a positive cumulative effect on compliance via tax morale in Italy. 
 
In developing countries, however, the probability of catching tax evaders and fraud is much 
lower due to the high informality of businesses and the tax authority’s limited tax enforcement 
(Besley and Persson 2014; Bird 1989; Carnahan 2015). As a result, developing countries often 
lack the tax information and enforcement capacity necessary to effectively implement the 
instruments of a modern tax system, such as VAT, income taxes and others. An alternative 
strategy to increase tax compliance, and thus revenue, in these countries may depend on the 
capacity of policymakers to harness individuals’ civicmindedness, social norms, reciprocity, 
and cultural values of trust (Prichard et al. 2019). To do so in an effective and targeted way, 
policymakers need clear evidence on how tax compliance correlates with key taxpayer 
characteristics. However, such evidence remains limited in the Global South, particularly in 
Africa. Our study aims to fill this gap and contribute to the literature on tax compliance, by 
exploring the relationship between tax compliance and business owners’ gender. 
 
In the growing body of behavioural literature on gender, the bulk of both experimental and 
survey-based studies show that there is a great deal of behavioural variation between men and 
women. For instance, women are more likely to exhibit helping behaviour (Andreoni and 
Vesterlund 2001; Eagly and Crowley 1986), vote based on social issues (Goertzel 1983), score 
more highly on 'integrity tests' (Ones and Viswesvaran 1998), take stronger stances on ethical 
behaviour (Glover, Bumpus, Sharp and Munchus 2002; Reiss and Mitra 1998), and behave 
more generously when faced with economic decisions (Eckel and Grossman 1998). Research 
findings also suggest that women are particularly effective in promoting honest government 
and greater representation of women in parliament would result a lower level of corruption 
(Dollar, Fisman and Gatti 2001). 
 
The existing literature has also revealed behavioural differences between men and women in 
decision making in risky situations and competitive business environments, which ultimately 
explain profitability differences. For instance, women are more risk-averse (see Barsky, Juster, 
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Kimball and Shapiro 1997; Bruce and Johnson 1994; Byrnes, Miller and Schafer 1999), less 
overconfident and trade less in financial markets than men (Barber and Odean 2001), and are 
less responsive to competitive incentives than their male counterparts (see Gneezy, Niederle 
and Rusticchini 2003). Such behavioural differences are also revealed in choices about 
committing crimes, which is related to tax evasion. As Braithwaite (1989: 44) clearly states 
‘crime is committed disproportionately by males’. Our question is: do we observe such 
differences in tax underreporting too?  
 
Indeed, when it comes to taxation specifically, men and women also appear to have different 
attitudes and behaviour. Studies in the US have shown that women tend to think the tax code 
is fairer, the likelihood of getting caught for evasion is greater and they overestimate the 
penalties for evasion (Kinsey 1992; Smith and Stalans 1991). In terms of behaviour, a number 
of tax compliance experiments have revealed women to be more compliant than men (Cadsby, 
Maynes and Trivedi 2006; Gërxhani 2007; Kastlunger, Dressler, Kirchler, Mittone and Vorcek 
2010). 
 
However, the evidence is not conclusive. as other studies argue that women are not generally 
more compliant than men. For instance, Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg (1978) found women 
more likely to evade taxes in a game-simulation context using 15 Israeli undergraduate 
students. Similarly, Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) asserted that women’s self-reported tax 
compliance was lower than men in Austria. A survey-based study by Ameyaw and Dzaka 
(2016) in Ghana also documented there are no significant gender differences in tax compliance 
and Chung and Trivedi (2003) only found women to be more compliant than men after providing 
them with persuasive reasons to pay taxes. 
 
In developed countries, where social, political and cultural gender equality is greater than in 
developing countries, studies still revealed significant differences in tax compliance behaviour 
between men and women. For example, D’Attoma, Volintiru and Steinmo (2017) conducted 
cross-country experimental study in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Italy. 
The findings indicate that women are significantly more compliant than men in all countries and 
under every condition. Whereas, in developing countries where women are highly marginalised 
and discriminated in every aspect, studies aimed at investigating the role of this behavioural 
difference in tax mobilisation (compliance) are scant. To the best of our knowledge, no study 
has attempted to explore how the business owners’ gender differential affects tax compliance 
in Ethiopia. Thus, it is important to address this research gap and investigate if gender plays 
any role in tax compliance in the Ethiopian context. 
 
Considering tax compliance as a pro-social act and risk-averse behaviour, and tax evasion and 
avoidance as anti-social and criminal acts, the gender of business enterprises owners could 
have a serious implication on how they pay their taxes. The central hypothesis we test in this 
study is that female owned business enterprises or partnership businesses owned by a female 
majority are more likely to be tax compliant. We test this hypothesis in the context of Ethiopia, 
where informality and evasion are widespread amongst businesses.  
 
Moreover, the relationship between firm size and tax compliance also remains mixed in 
literature. For instance, using sales as a measure of firm size, Joulfaian (2000) examines 
corporate tax evasion behaviour and finds that larger firms experience less noncompliance in 
the US. On the contrary, Amanda and Frida (2018) documented evidence that large firms are 
more likely to tax avoid compared to smaller firms in Sweden. In addition to this, the political 
power theory of firms claims that larger firms have more possibilities to influence the political 
process in their favour to avoid more tax (Siegfried 1972). Given this literature, this study also 
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aims to examine whether the impact of gender on tax compliance is different across firm size.  
This study aims to address the following specific research questions: 
 
• Is there any difference in tax compliance among male and female owned enterprises? 
• Does the gender composition of enterprise owners influence tax compliance? 
• Does the impact of the owners’ gender on tax compliance vary across firm size?  
To answer these questions, we estimate the log odds ratios from a logit model to describe the 
probability of being tax compliant using survey and administrative tax data from business 
enterprises in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In this study, tax compliance refers to declaring the right 
amount of taxable business income in a given fiscal year and non-compliance refers to 
underreporting taxable business income. Thus, our compliance variable is a dummy variable 
with value 1 for compliant firms and 0 for noncompliant ones.  
The novelty of this research lies on using a combination of taxpayers’ administrative data and 
survey data for two reasons. On the one hand, measuring tax compliance from survey data is 
not possible as individuals are less likely be honest about their inherently dishonest behaviours. 
On the other hand, firm specific characteristics, business environment information and owners’ 
characteristics are generally missing in administrative data. This study leverages on the 
advantages of combining the two data sources and becomes the first study to explore the role 
of business owners’ gender on tax compliance in a developing country context.  
The results show that businesses owned by a female-majority are more likely to be tax 
compliant than those male-majority owned businesses. The results also document robust 
evidence that the probability of being tax compliant increases as the ownership share of women 
in businesses increases. Moreover, the relative gender effect on tax compliance increases with 
firm size. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a brief context on business 
income tax in Ethiopia. Section 2 presents data and method of analysis employed followed by 
Section 3 with a descriptive analysis and variable descriptions. Section 4 discusses the main 
findings, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
1 Business income tax context in Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia’s economy has experienced rapid and broad-based growth since 2007. However, 
sustaining such economic growth requires strong domestic resource mobilisation, mainly 
boosting its tax revenue. To that end, improving tax compliance has been a key focus for the 
government. Tax revenue collected increased from 43 billion Birr in 2010 to 165 billion Birr by 
the end of 2015. It further increased to 268 billion Birr in 2019. But the tax revenue to GDP 
share remained low in the country; 13.3 per cent in 2015 and 11.2 per cent in 2019. These 
achievements are lower than the target of an average 15 per cent for the first growth and 
transformation plan period (2010 – 2015) and 17.2 per cent for the second growth 
transformation plan (2015/16 – 2019/20).  
 
The government of Ethiopia collects direct and indirect taxes. Our study focuses on business 
income tax, which is one of the common direct taxes that businesses face (Category A, B and 
C). Business income tax accounts for a fairly large share of total tax revenue in Ethiopia. As 
the 2010/11 national bank annual report indicates, 17.06 per cent of the total tax revenue was 
collected from business incomes (National Bank of Ethiopia 2011). This share of business 
income tax in the total tax revenue further increased to 22.13 per cent in the Ethiopian fiscal 
year 2018/19.  
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According to the federal income tax proclamation 979/2016, the taxable business income of a 
taxpayer for a tax year shall be the total business income less the total deductions for the year 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2016). That is, taxable business income is 
determined based on profit and loss or income statement.  
The rate applicable to taxable business incomes from business entities (e.g. sole 
proprietorship, PLC, Share Company) is flat at 30 per cent. But, the rates of business income 
tax applicable to individuals and Micro Enterprises vary from 0 per cent up to 35 per cent, 
depending on the amount of taxable business income per the tax year. These taxpayers are 
required to file a tax declaration and pay their tax in the period prescribed by law.  
However, the Ethiopian Ministry of Revenue (MoR) may need to audit some or all of its 
taxpayers to verify if taxpayers are paying the right amount of tax at the right time. The tax 
department of the authority undertakes auditing using risk criteria based on previous 
noncompliant taxpayer records, unexpected inconsistency between past income statements 
and current declared taxable income, and information from other private and public institutions, 
as well as individuals. This clearly shows that the decision to audit taxpayers is not random. 
The audit results tell us the tax compliance status of the taxpayer. For this study, a taxpayer is 
compliant if the audit results confirm that the taxpayer has never been found guilty of 
underreporting taxable business income. Otherwise, the taxpayer is noncompliant.  
 
2 Data and method of analysis 
  
2.1 Data type and sources  
 
This study combines primary and secondary datasets. More specifically, we combine 
administrative tax data from the Ministry of Revenues (MoR) and survey data we collected from 
408 taxpayers randomly selected business establishments 1  in Addis Ababa. Among 408 
representative sample firms, only 315 (77.2 per cent) were found to have been audited by the 
tax administration at least once in the period between 2008 and 2018. Even though audit 
decision by the tax department is not random in its nature, the 315 taxpayers account for most 
of the randomly selected sample and could be considered as representative of the population 
of enterprises.  
The administrative data consists of tax declaration of business income, audit history and 
penalty information. Based on this information, we determine the tax compliance status of 
businesses. Accordingly, noncompliant businesses are those businesses fined for understating 
taxable income at least once between 2008 and 2018. Compliant businesses, on the other 
hand, are those firms that have never been fined for understating taxable income in this period.  
Our survey data consists of detailed information on the sample businesses. It provides 
information on business characteristics, such as year of establishment, number of permanent 
and temporary employees, and legal status of firms. In addition, it provides ownership and 
managerial attributes of our sample firms, including age, education, vocational training and 
 
1 The administrative data from MOR consists of 11,457 unique establishments based in Addis Ababa. The sample of 408 was 
randomly selected from this list and by virtue of its randomness, we believe it can be representative of the businesses, 
particularly sole proprietorship and private limited companies. As a matter of fact, unless a taxpayer is not audited, it is hardly 
possible to discuss tax compliance behavior. That is the reason why our compliance analysis in the rest of the paper was 
conditional on the audit status of businesses.    
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years of prior business experience of the owner with majority ownership share, share of women 
in ownership and top-level management positions. Our survey data also provides information 
on tax perceptions and attitudes towards tax policy, tax administration, fairness and complexity 
of Ethiopian tax system and the general business environment.  
 
2.2 Methods of analysis 
 
Apart from presenting descriptive analysis of the survey data, we empirically estimate the 
association between owners’ gender and the probability of being tax compliant. Specifically, 
we test if women (majority) owned firms are more likely to be tax compliant, using a traditional 
probability model, controlling for other covariates, such as business owner characteristics (age, 
training, education and prior business experience), firm specific characteristics (firm size and 
firm age) and business environment factors (business environment index and informal 
competition). The equation that we estimate here takes the following general form: 
 
                𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽′ + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖                 (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable for tax compliance status of firm i, taking value 1 for compliant 
and 0 for noncompliant, 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖  is our main variable of interest capturing gender of 
businesses owners, Xi consists of the vector of covariates that are believed to determine 
business tax compliance, 𝛿𝛿  is the coefficient of our gender variable and 𝛽𝛽  is a vector of 
coefficients of variables in vector Xi, 𝛼𝛼 is constant and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 represents error term. 
 
As estimating equation (1) using OLS (the linear probability model) has its own shortcomings, 
the main analysis in this paper is based on results from a non-linear model. Specifically, we 
estimate the log-odds ratios from a logit specification describing the probability of being tax 
compliant. Below is the mathematical model following Greene (2003):  
 
   Pr(Yi=1|Femalei, Xi) =Ʌ(𝛿𝛿Femalei, β'Xi)   i=1,.....N       (2) 
We also estimate equation (2) by splitting the sample by firm size so that we can test if the 
gender effect on tax compliance behaviour varies across firm size, as measured by the number 
of full-time permanent workers. 
 
3 Descriptive analysis 
 
3.1 Audit intensity and tax compliance 
 
Irrespective of the audit status of businesses, the administrative data shows that all our sample 
businesses faced at least one of a number of penalties between 2008 and 2018 for reasons 
such as late filing, late payments and others. These fines are not actually based on audit 
results, rather mainly because taxpayers fail to respect deadlines and maintain proper 
documentations. For instance, as filing and payment systems are not digital and sophisticated 
in Ethiopia, taxpayers usually face a long queue within the tax filing and payment periods. 
Thus, many of them might opt to pay fines for late filing and late payments to avoid long waiting 
time.  
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Out of the total 408 sample firms, declared taxable income from 77.2 per cent (315) of the 
enterprises were audited by the tax authority for understatement of taxable income at least 
once between 2008 and 2018. The audit result determines compliant status of firms. The rest 
of taxpayers in this sample, 22.8 per cent (93), have never been audited for possible tax 
understatement or avoidance. It is important to note that the fact that businesses were not 
audited does not mean they were compliant throughout the stated period. Rather, it only implies 
that these firms were not selected for audit by the authority. Table 3.1 presents the intensity of 
auditing (number of audits) for tax understatement and follow-up penalty status that the sample 
businesses faced between 2008 and 2018.  
 
Table 3.1 Tax revision and penalty intensity in the period 2008-2018 
Tax audit intensity (N=315) Penalty intensity for tax understatement (N=315) 
Intensity (#) Frequency  Per cent Intensity (#)  Frequency  Per cent 
1 48 15.24 0 200 63.49 
2 56 17.78 1 101 32.06 
3 68 21.59 2 13 4.13 
4 60 19.05 3 1 0.32 
5 36 11.43    
6 26 8.25    
7 14 4.44    
8 5 1.59    
9 2 0.63    
Source: Ethiopian MoR Administrative data from 2008-2018 (Authors’ computation) 
 
The tax revision process through auditing happens when the tax department suspects the 
trustworthiness of the already declared taxable income by taxpayers. Those taxpayers found 
guilty would be fined by the department. Accordingly, the audit data shows that 63.5 per cent 
(200) of the audited sample (315) were never fined due to understatement of taxable income. 
These businesses are the ‘compliant’ taxpayer enterprises. The noncompliant enterprises in 
this study are, on the other hand, enterprises that were found guilty of understating their taxable 
income at least once in the period 2008-2018. In our audited sample of enterprises, 36.5 per 
cent (115) were fined at least once or more in the 11 year period. As Table 3.1 presents, almost 
67 per cent of the audited sample have been investigated three or more times in the period. 
However, only one firm was found guilty of understating taxable income three times in the 
period. This may suggest that as enterprises experience audit more frequently, they tend to 
become more compliant.  
 
3.2 Tax compliance: attitudes and perceptions from the survey 
 
Respondents were asked the reason for paying their taxes as required by the tax regulation. 
Responses for this question indicate that 94 per cent of the respondents pay taxes as per the 
regulation because ‘it is their duty as citizen’. Those who pay tax for fear of ‘severe punishment 
for tax evasion’ account 5 per cent of the sample. Only five respondents pay their taxes as 
required by the law because they ‘do not know how to minimise taxes’. According to these 
responses, the behaviour of most of our sample can be characterised as ‘voluntarily compliant’, 
as they regard paying tax as their citizenship duty. Those who pays taxes because of either 
lack of knowledge on how to minimise their tax or fear of severe punishment are ‘involuntarily 
compliant’. However, linking survey responses with the respective penalty history of firms, the 
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trustworthiness of these responses is highly questionable. For instance, 36.5 per cent of those 
who stated ‘I pay taxes because I believe doing so is my duty as a citizen’ were found guilty of 
understating tax. In addition, 44 per cent of those who claimed ‘fear of severe punishment’ was 
the main reason for paying their tax as per the rule were also penalised at least once between 
2008 and 2018.  
We have also asked the responders’ level of agreement with other people’s thoughts, 
especially regarding statements such as ‘people think that it is sometimes reasonable to 
underreport tax if they get the chance’ and ‘people think it is okay not to pay tax on cash 
transactions’. The responses are presented in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1 Compliance perception 
 
 
Source: Authors’ Survey Data, 2019 
 
The majority of the respondents in our survey, more than 63 per cent, disagree or strongly 
disagree with what people think on paying tax on cash transactions and underreporting tax. 
These responses can be used to imply the compliance behaviour of respondents. For example, 
66 per cent of respondents disagree/strongly disagree with the statement ‘people think it is 
sometimes reasonable to underreport tax if they get the chance’. On average, those who 
disagree with the statement are expected to be compliant and those in agreement with the idea 
to be noncompliant. The compliance perception has no significant correlation with respondents’ 
gender, rather we found a strong correlation with business owners’ gender. For instance, 
respondents from businesses with male majority owners tend to agree or be neutral with 
‘people think that it is sometimes reasonable to underreport tax if they get the chance’ and 
firms are more likely to be penalised for ‘understating tax’ in comparison to businesses 
dominantly owned by women. 
 
3.3 Female ownership and participation in top level management of firms  
 
3.3.1 Ownership of firms  
 
The World Bank (WB) enterprise survey data (2015) shows that women participate in the 
ownership of 29.6 per cent of firms in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), while only 12.3 per cent of 
firms are owned by a women majority. The same survey indicates that the Ethiopian business 
environment outperforms the SSA average on both indicators: women participate in the 
ownership of 36.2 per cent of firms, while women majority ownership of firms is at 16.3 per 
cent. However, in our 2019 survey, as presented in Figure 3.2, there exist women among the 
owners in 49.5 per cent of the establishments and women own 50 per cent or the majority in 
34.56 per cent of the sample establishments. This balanced participation of women in business 
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ownership is unexpected and it might be because the sample is only from Addis Ababa, which 
is relatively more developed as a large capital city, while the WB survey is drawn from firms 
across different parts of the country, including more remote and smaller cities. 
 
  Figure 3.2 Business ownership participation by gender  
 
 
Source: Authors’ Survey Data, 2019 
 
3.3.2 Participation in top level management of firms 
Women participation in top level business management in Ethiopia is very low. The World Bank 
enterprise survey data (2015) indicates that only 8.8 per cent of the 847 firms in question had 
a female top manager, which was far below the SSA average: 15.5 per cent in the same survey 
year. Figure 3.3 presents the participation of women in top level business management from 
our survey. It shows that women engage in top management positions in 46.6 per cent of the 
businesses. Women dominate top level management positions in around 14 per cent of firms 
and they completely control all those positions in 6.9 per cent (28) of the businesses in the 
sample. 
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  Figure 3.3 Women’s participation in top level business management  
 
Source: Authors’ Survey Data 2019    
  
3.4 Variable description and mean difference between compliant and 
noncompliant firms 
 
In Table 3.2 below, we describe the variables used in our model estimation. It also depicts the 
mean value of the variables based on firms’ tax compliance status of 315 audited firms. The 
values in the third, fourth and fifth column represents the mean values of continuous variables 
and the percentage of categorical variables for compliant, noncompliant and the total sample, 
respectively. The last column depicts a two-sample t-test of mean difference of the continuous 
and dummy variables, while we use chi-square test of independence for categorical variables. 
We account for factors that potentially determine tax compliance behaviour of businesses by 
grouping them into three different categories: owner characteristics, firm characteristics and 
business-environment-related factors. To shed light on some of the covariates, emphasis is 
given for variables that have a significant difference between compliant and noncompliant 
owners. Related to owner characteristics, on average noncompliant business owners are found 
to be younger, less educated and with minimal years of business experience before starting 
their businesses.  
On the other hand, a statistically significant difference is also observed among compliant and 
noncompliant firms based on whether the owner bears any vocational or technical training 
related to the business. From the audited sample, owners have business related vocational or 
technical training in 47 per cent of the businesses, with a relatively larger proportion of them 
(26 per cent) being among the compliant firms. 
 
Concerning firm related characteristics and business environment factors, the average age of 
firms is found to be 13 years, while the average number of permanent workers in the sample 
business is almost 45 persons. While the average business environment index is 2.54 for the 
total sample, there is no significant difference in business environment assessment between 
respondents of compliant and noncompliant firms. This index ranges from 1 to 4. The more the 
index approaches to 4 the more severely the business environment becomes obstacle for 
business operations.
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Table 3.2 Definition, variable description, and summary statistics by tax compliance status 
Variable Name Variable Description Average 
(Overall sample) 
Average 
(Compliant)  
Average 
(Noncompliant)  
Mean 
Difference 
Owners Characteristics 
AGE Age of the owner in years   45.89 45.50  46.56 1.06 
AGE SQUARED Age squared of the owner in years   2228.80 2183.46 2307.66 -124.2 
GENDER  1= if share >=50% of a business is owned by women 34.29 39.50 25.23 14.28** 
GENDER 1 1= if share >=60% of a business is owned by women 17.46 21.50 10.43 11.07** 
GENDER 2 Female ownership shares from 0% to 100% 28.90 32.03 23.46 8.57* 
EDUC 1= if the owner has diploma or above  61.27 59.00 65.22 -6.22 
TRAIN 
1= if the owner has any Technical and Vocational Education Training 
(TVET) related to the business 46.98  41.00 57.39 -16.39** 
EXP Business experience before starting the business (in years)  6.43 6.79 5.79 1.00 
Firm Characteristics and Business Environment 
FIRM AGE The age of the firm in years  13.62 13.35 14.08 -0.73 
FIRM AGE 
SQUARED Square of firm’s age in years  222.49 212.36 240.11 -27.75 
PERWORK Total number of permanent workers  45.20 39.70 54.76 -15.06 
BEVTIN Index2 of business environment factors  2.54 2.55 2.52     0.03 
 
INFCOMP 
   
Informal competition =1 if practices of competitors in the informal 
sector is not an obstacle  32.70 21.90 10.79 11.11 
2= a minor obstacle 13.65 8.25 5.40 2.85 
3= a moderate obstacle 19.37 13.33 6.03 7.3 
4= a major obstacle 34.29 20.00 14.29 5.71 
Legal status Individual = 1 and Private Company LT=0 46.35 50.05 39.13 11.37** 
Compliant=200 (63.49%), Noncompliant = 115 (36.51%), * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Authors’ Survey Data in 2019 and Ethiopian MoR Administrative data from 2008-2018
 
2 Business Environment Index (BEVTIN) is calculated from 15 business environment factors. The index ranges from 1 up to 4: an index value1 indicates that business environment 
factors, on average, are ‘no obstacle’ while index value 4 indicates that the factors are ‘major obstacle’ for one’s business operation.  
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4 Econometric results and discussion 
 
This section presents econometrics estimation results from the logit model to examine the effect 
of the business owners’ gender on tax compliance, along with other covariates. In order to account 
for different gender indicators and check result robustness, we estimated three models with 
different gender indictors in each model. The model well fits the data, which is confirmed by the 
significance of the likelihood ratio, overall test of significance. Following is the interpretations of 
the empirical results compared with findings from related studies in the area.  
 
Table 4.1: Logit model regression results 
 
Variables (Dependent variable: tax compliance (=1 a firm is 
compliant and =0 noncompliant)) 
(LPM)3 (Logit Models) 
1 2 3 4 
AGE 0.0289* 0.140* 0.137* 0.132* 
 (0.0169) (0.0779) (0.0785) (0.0779) 
AGE SQUARED -0.000313* -0.00151** -0.00145* -0.00141* 
 (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
GENDER (=1 if share >=50% owned by women) 0.197*** 0.955***   
 (0.0537) (0.2742)   
GENDER 1 (=1 if share >=60% owned by women)   1.134***  
   (0.3766)  
GENDER 2 (female ownership share, 0 - 100%)    0.0114*** 
    (0.0037) 
EDUC (=1 if Diploma and Above) -0.00155 0.00385 -0.00337 0.00430 
  (0.0587) (0.2769) (0.2773) (0.2764) 
TRAIN (=1 if owner has TVET) -0.181*** -0.869*** -0.900*** -0.868*** 
 (0.0558) (0.2716) (0.2766) (0.2759) 
EXP (Years of prior business experience of owner) 0.00608* 0.0286* 0.0248 0.0276 
 (0.0036) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0175) 
FIRM AGE -0.00125 -0.00420 -0.00412 -0.00728 
 (0.0123) (0.0577) (0.0579) (0.0573) 
FIRM AGE SQUARED -7.54e-08 -0.0000133 0.0000163 0.0000594 
 (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Ln (PERWORK) -0.0468** -0.221** -0.185* -0.221** 
 (0.0228) (0.1050) (0.1053) (0.1036) 
BEVTIN 0.0705 0.326 0.293 0.306 
 (0.0544) (0.2580) (0.2594) (0.2593) 
INFCOMP (No obstacle is the base category)     
Minor Obstacle -0.108 -0.535 -0.559 -0.548 
 (0.0861) (0.4142) (0.4011) (0.4074) 
Moderate Obstacle -0.0581 -0.278 -0.284 -0.290 
 (0.0766) (0.3861) (0.3935) (0.3928) 
Major Obstacle -0.195*** -0.944*** -0.904*** -0.936*** 
 (0.0706) (0.3440) (0.3401) (0.3437) 
Constant 0.0404 -2.277 -2.153 -2.042 
 (0.4055) (1.8514) (1.8632) (1.8464) 
N 315 315 315 315 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
4.1 Gender and tax compliance  
This study mainly sought to answer the key research question, which is how owners’ gender affect 
the tax compliance behaviour of enterprises. In other words, it aims at testing the central 
hypothesis that female owned businesses are more compliant than male owned ones. The logit 
model estimation results show that compared with male business owners, the likelihood of being 
tax compliant is larger for female business owners. That confirms our hypothesis and in terms of 
magnitude of gender ownership effect, (majority) female owned businesses are on average 19.8 
 
3 The first column presents estimation results from a Linear Probability Model (LPM) for the sake of completeness.  
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percentage points more likely to be tax compliant than the (majority) male owned businesses (see 
Table 4.2, Model 2). This marginal effect of (majority) female owners on tax compliance becomes 
stronger, increasing on average to 23.6 percentage points in Model 3.  
 
Table 4.2 Marginal effects of firm owners’ gender on tax compliance from the logit models 
Models Variables  dy/dx Std.Err z P> |z| [90% C.Interval] 
Model 2 GENDER 0.1977 0.0535 3.70 0.000 0.1098 0.2857 
Model 3 GENDER 1 0.2362 0.0742 3.18 0.001 0.1141 0.3584 
Model 4 GENDER 2 0.0024 0.0007 3.20 0.001 0.0012 0.0036 
 
In order to ascertain the robustness of our result, we use the alternative measures/indicators of 
gender. The first measure is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the share of female 
business ownership is greater than or equal to 50 per cent. The second one is similar to the first 
measure, but, in this case, it takes value 1 if the share of female ownership in the business is 
greater than or equal to 60 per cent. Finally, we proxy gender as a continuous variable given by 
the business ownership share of women. The sign and the significance of our variable of interest, 
owners’ gender, remains robust in all the alternative measures. 
As it can be seen in all the three columns of Table 4.1, the coefficient of owners’ gender on tax 
compliance is positive and significant. The implication is that businesses owned by women or 
women majority are more likely to be tax compliant than those male or male majority owned 
businesses. The results also document evidence that probability of being tax compliant increases 
as the ownership share of women in the business increases. Table 4.2 indicates that as share of 
women ownership in a business increases by 1 per cent, on average, the likelihood of the 
business to be tax compliant increases by 0.24 per cent (Model 4). This also implies that 100 per 
cent of female owned businesses, on average, have a 24 percentage points higher chance of 
being tax compliant than 100 per cent of male owned businesses.  
 
We would argue that this tax compliance difference based on gender is attributed to the 
behavioural difference among men and women. Many studies in the behavioural science focusing 
on tax compliance behaviour have also shown that women are more ethical than men in paying 
taxes (Beron, Tauchen and Witte 1992; Kinsey 1992; Scholz and Pinney 1995; Smith 1992; 
Spicer and Hero; 1985). Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar (2006) also documented evidence that being 
female increase tax compliance compared to male in Malaysia. In line with these studies, Torgler 
and Valev (2010) also found significantly greater aversion to corruption and tax evasion among 
women than men in different countries and at different times. In addition to the findings of previous 
studies, we explore reasons behind our regression results from the survey data in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Potential reasons for women owned businesses being relatively more tax 
compliant 
 
Variables  Male (N=207) Female (N=108) Diff 
Audit intensity 3.579 3.287 0.292 
Reasonable to underreport4 3.430 3.898 -0.468*** 
 
4 In our survey, respondents from businesses were asked to express their agreement/disagreement towards the statement ‘People 
think that it is sometimes reasonable to underreport tax…’ The possible responses were coded as ‘Strongly agree=1’, ‘Agree=2’, 
‘Neutral=3’, ‘Disagree=4’ and ‘Strongly disagree=5’.   
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Easiness of Tax refund application5 3.343 3.139 0.204** 
MOR Fairness (1=fair, 0=unfair) 0.333 0.454 -0.121** 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source: Authors’ Survey, 2019 
 
Firstly, we understand that on average, there is no significant audit intensity difference among 
male and female owned firms, implying that the probability of being audited is random and the tax 
department has no prior tendency to target male owned businesses. This confirms that the gender 
tax compliance differential presented in Table 4.1 is not attributed to the fact that female owned 
businesses were less frequently audited by the tax authority. 
 
Secondly, female owned businesses representatives are more likely to disagree with the view 
that ‘people think it is sometimes reasonable to underreport tax’ and have a more positive attitude 
towards the tax system than their male counterparts. For instance, women are more likely to think 
it is easier to apply for a tax refund and they also believe MOR treats businesses more fairly 
compared to men (Table 4.3). 
 
4.2 Firm size, owners’ gender and tax compliance 
 
In this study, firm size is measured by (natural log of) the number of permanent workers in the 
establishment. As Table 4.1 presents, the probability of being tax compliant declines as firm size 
increases. A 1 per cent increase in the number of permanent workers is associated with about 
0.038 to 0.046 percentage points reduction in the likelihood of being tax compliant (Appendix 1). 
This result is statistically significant and consistent across all the considered models. One 
plausible justification could be that larger firms take more risk of underreporting their income, as 
the expected gain increases with firm size or large firms are more likely to underestimate the 
institutional capacity to catch them – i.e. they assign a lower probability of being caught and/or 
relatively lower penalty for evading taxes. On the other hand, in our previous analysis we showed 
the correlation between firm owners’ gender and tax compliance. 
 
Yet, from the preceding discussions, we cannot understand whether owners’ gender has 
heterogeneously correlated with tax compliance behaviour across different firm sizes. To better 
understand the dynamics, we analyse the correlation between tax compliance and gender across 
firm size following two different approaches. First, we predicted the marginal effect of owners’ 
gender at different values of firm size (Ln (PERWORK)) from the logit models estimated in Table 
4.1. Second, we estimate the logit models for different group of firms based on their size. This 
enables us to compare the coefficients or marginal effects of the gender variables on compliance 
for different groups. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that the correlation between gender and tax compliance is firm size dependent 
and it is significant. As the number of permanent workers (log) increases, the likelihood of being 
tax compliant becomes higher for women owned enterprises, compared with men owned ones. 
For instance, if we compare the marginal effect of gender between firm size 1 and 6, it becomes 
higher by around 3.4 percentage points for women in the latter case, considering our first definition 
of gender (column 1). The results are consistent across the three models documenting robust 
heterogenous effect of gender on tax compliance across firm sizes. 
 
 
 
5 We also asked business representatives to rate easiness of ‘tax refund application’ as ‘very easy=1’, ‘easy=2’, ‘difficult=3’ and 
‘very difficult=4’. 
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Table 4.4 Marginal tax compliance effect of gender across firm size 
 
Firm Size  
(Ln (PERWORK)) 
Marginal effect across different models 
GENDER  GENDER _1 GENDER _2  
0 0.1654 0.2051 0.001990 
1 0.1803 0.2196 0.002173 
2 0.1933 0.2324 0.002333 
2.5 0.1989 0.2380 0.002401 
3 0.2038 0.2429 0.002461 
3.5 0.2078 0.2472 0.002510 
4 0.2110 0.2507 0.002549 
4.5 0.2132 0.2535 0.002577 
5 0.2145 0.2555 0.002593 
6 0.2142 0.2570 0.002589 
 
For the second approach, we categorise firms in to two groups: one group only consists of micro 
and small business and the other group accounts for medium and large business. Our definition 
of firm size follows FeMSEDA (2011) that micro and small enterprises are those entities with 30 
or lower workers, while medium and large firms are businesses that employ more than 30 workers. 
The results are presented in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Logit model estimation results by firm size groups 
Variables (Dependent variable: tax compliance 
(=1 a firm is compliant and =0 noncompliant)) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Micro and 
Small 
Medium 
and large 
Micro and 
Small 
Medium 
and large 
Micro and 
Small 
Medium 
and large 
AGE 0.128 0.228 0.128 0.184 0.124 0.142 
 (0.0892) (0.2141) (0.0910) (0.2080) (0.0897) (0.2173) 
AGE SQUARED -0.00152* -0.00194 -0.00146 -0.00159 -0.00145 -0.00111 
 (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0021) 
GENDER (=1 if share >=50% by women) 0.792** 1.594**     
 (0.3264) (0.6257)     
GENDER 1(=1 if share >=60% by women)   1.101** 1.259   
   (0.4478) (0.9784)   
GENDER 2 (female ownership, 0 - 100%)     0.00883** 0.0238** 
     (0.0043) (0.0111) 
EDUC (=1 if Diploma or Above) -0.162 0.514 -0.150 0.646 -0.179 0.660 
  (0.3195) (0.6661) (0.3153) (0.6953) (0.3171) (0.6606) 
TRAIN (=1 if owner has TVET) -0.727** -1.452** -0.829** -1.045* -0.752** -1.242* 
 (0.3208) (0.6527) (0.3307) (0.6295) (0.3262) (0.6832) 
EXP (Years of prior business experience) 0.0522** -0.00912 0.0518** -0.000778 0.0516** -0.0109 
 (0.0253) (0.0298) (0.0252) (0.0292) (0.0258) (0.0292) 
FIRM AGE -0.0596 0.158 -0.0508 0.106 -0.0566 0.108 
 (0.0673) (0.1394) (0.0673) (0.1220) (0.0669) (0.1322) 
FIRM AGE SQUARED 0.000891 -0.00268 0.000640 -0.000928 0.000779 -0.00149 
 (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0027) 
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BEVTIN 0.391 -0.187 0.327 -0.0882 0.352 -0.0546 
 (0.2907) (0.6796) (0.2986) (0.6680) (0.2927) (0.7030) 
INFCOMP (No obstacle is the base category)     
Minor Obstacle -0.579 -0.718 -0.541 -1.278 -0.570 -1.045 
 (0.4814) (0.9714) (0.4708) (1.0064) (0.4764) (0.9368) 
Moderate Obstacle -0.0215 -0.590 0.00868 -0.799 -0.0300 -0.585 
 (0.4860) (0.7858) (0.4946) (0.7459) (0.4900) (0.8055) 
Major Obstacle -1.184*** 0.0848 -1.142*** 0.0658 -1.150*** -0.0228 
 (0.4016) (0.8180) (0.4005) (0.7650) (0.4023) (0.8133) 
Constant -1.748 -7.231 -1.676 -5.808 -1.583 -5.352 
 (2.1116) (5.6680) (2.1503) (5.2971) (2.1210) (5.5408) 
Marginal effect of gender  0.1549 0.3075 0.2142 0.2598 0.0017 0.0047 
N 243 72 243 72 243 72 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
                  
Results in Table 4.5 shows that estimated gender coefficients are significantly positive and 
different for the two firm groups, except in Model 4. The most plausible reason for the 
insignificance coefficient of the gender variable in Model 4 is a lower sample size. In this model, 
we use a strict definition of gender and there is very limited variation in the data. In terms of 
magnitude, the average marginal effect of gender is higher in the medium and large firms than 
micro and small ones (bottom row of Table 4.5). 
 
5 Conclusion  
  
The Ethiopian economy has been growing and sustaining such economic growth requires strong 
domestic resource mobilisation, mainly boosting its tax revenue. Domestic resource mobilisation 
through the form of taxation is a vital tool to finance government budgets and speed up economic 
growth. However, the amount of collected taxes is still below the expected level in Ethiopia. This 
is mainly caused by the existence of widespread tax evasion, corruption, and limited 
administrative and enforcement capacity. In the absence of enforcement capacity, increasing tax 
revenues and financing development expenditures in developing countries, like Ethiopia, usually 
depends on the capacity of policymakers to harness individuals’ civic mindedness, social norms, 
reciprocity and cultural values of trust. However, how social values, norms and individual 
behavioural differences can play a role in reducing tax evasion needs empirical evidence.  
In line with this, our study aims to explore the role of business owners’ gender on tax compliance 
in Ethiopian enterprises. This study also aims at scrutinising whether firm size has different 
implications on the tax compliance behaviour of male and female owned enterprises.  
To address these objectives, we combine tax audit registry data with survey data we collected 
from 408 enterprises. The estimation results from the logit model reveal a statistically significant 
difference in the tax compliance behaviour of enterprises owned by men and women. Controlling 
for different covariates including firm characteristics, ownership characteristics and business 
environment factors, the results confirm the commonly held view that female owned enterprises 
are, on average, more likely to be compliant than their male counterparts. Moreover, tax 
compliance behaviour of enterprises is also size dependent. From the result, it is evident that the 
probability of being tax compliant significantly declines as firm size increases, irrespective of firm 
owners’ gender. There is also robust evidence that female owned businesses become relatively 
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more compliant than male owned businesses in larger size businesses, than in smaller ones. 
 
The result of the study implies that, polices aimed at improving tax administration system, 
introducing new tax enforcement and audit practices should consider the behavioural difference 
between male and female owners. Moreover, it is also necessary to improve women business 
participation in the country for equity concerns and as minimising tax evasion is one of the 
multifaceted social benefits of encouraging women entrepreneurs.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1 
 
Marginal effects from the Logit Models 
 
Models Variables  dy/dx Std.Err z P> |z| [90% C.Interval] 
Model 2 AGE 0.0290 0.0159 1.82 0.068 0.0028 0.0551 
 
AGE SQUARED -0.0003 0.0002 -2 0.046 -0.0006 -0.0001 
 
GENDER 0.1977 0.0535 3.7 0 0.1098 0.2857 
 
EDUC 0.0008 0.0573 0.01 0.989 -0.0935 0.0951 
 
TRAIN -0.1798 0.0530 -3.39 0.001 -0.2670 -0.0926 
 
EXP 0.0059 0.0035 1.68 0.094 0.0001 0.0117 
 
FIRM AGE -0.0009 0.0119 -0.07 0.942 -0.0205 0.0188 
 
FIRM AGE SQUARED 0.0000 0.0003 -0.01 0.992 -0.0005 0.0004 
 
Ln (PERWORK) -0.0458 0.0212 -2.16 0.031 -0.0808 -0.0109 
 
BEVTIN 0.0675 0.0530 1.27 0.203 -0.0197 0.1547 
      INFCOMP (No obstacle is the base category) 
 
Minor Obstacle -0.1049 0.0820 -1.28 0.201 -0.2399 0.0300 
 
Moderate Obstacle -0.0525 0.0729 -0.72 0.471 -0.1725 0.0674 
 
Major Obstacle -0.1933 0.0662 -2.92 0.004 -0.3023 -0.0844 
Model 2 AGE 0.0286 0.0161 1.77 0.077 0.0020 0.0551 
 
AGE SQUARED -0.0003 0.0002 -1.89 0.059 -0.0006 0.0000 
 
GENDER 1 0.2362 0.0742 3.18 0.001 0.1141 0.3584 
 
EDUC -0.0007 0.0578 -0.01 0.99 -0.0957 0.0943 
 
TRAIN -0.1874 0.0535 -3.5 0 -0.2754 -0.0995 
 
EXP 0.0052 0.0036 1.44 0.149 -0.0007 0.0110 
 
FIRM AGE -0.0009 0.0121 -0.07 0.943 -0.0207 0.0190 
 
FIRM AGE SQUARED 0.0000 0.0003 0.01 0.99 -0.0005 0.0005 
 
Ln (PERWORK) -0.0386 0.0216 -1.79 0.074 -0.0741 -0.0030 
 
BEVTIN 0.0611 0.0538 1.13 0.257 -0.0275 0.1496 
      INFCOMP (No obstacle is the base category) 
 
Minor Obstacle -0.1111 0.0802 -1.38 0.166 -0.2430 0.0209 
 
Moderate Obstacle -0.0544 0.0754 -0.72 0.471 -0.1784 0.0696 
 
Major Obstacle -0.1864 0.0662 -2.82 0.005 -0.2953 -0.0776 
Model 4 AGE 0.0275 0.0161 1.71 0.087 0.0011 0.0539 
 
AGE SQUARE -0.0003 0.0002 -1.87 0.062 -0.0006 0.0000 
 
GENDER 2 0.0024 0.0007 3.2 0.001 0.0012 0.0036 
 
EDUC 0.0009 0.0578 0.02 0.988 -0.0941 0.0959 
 
TRAIN -0.1813 0.0540 -3.36 0.001 -0.2701 -0.0925 
 
EXP 0.0058 0.0036 1.61 0.108 -0.0001 0.0117 
 
FIRM AGE -0.0015 0.0120 -0.13 0.899 -0.0212 0.0182 
 
FIRM AGE SQUARE 0.0000 0.0003 0.04 0.964 -0.0004 0.0005 
 
Ln (PERWORK) -0.0462 0.0212 -2.18 0.029 -0.0811 -0.0114 
 
BEVTIN 0.0639 0.0539 1.19 0.236 -0.0248 0.1525 
      INFCOMP (No obstacle is the base category) 
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Minor Obstacle -0.1084 0.0813 -1.33 0.182 -0.2422 0.0253 
 
Moderate Obstacle -0.0553 0.0749 -0.74 0.461 -0.1785 0.0680 
 
Major Obstacle -0.1933 0.0665 -2.91 0.004 -0.3028 -0.0839 
Note: N=315, Dependent variable is tax compliance (=1 if a firm is compliant and =0 otherwise), Model VCE is Robust.  
